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THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING ACT: THE LICENSEE 
EDITORIALIZING BAN AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT. 
This instrument can teach, it can illuminate; yes, it can even 
inspire. But it can do so only to the extent that humans are 
determined to use it to those ends. Otherwise, it is merely 
lights and wires in a box.1 
The average American household watches television nearly six 
and one-half hours per day.2 The only activity that dominates 
more of our time is sleeping, although some have categorized the 
two as synonymous.3 The impact of television on our lives is 
staggering, but attempts to channel that power into a positive 
force have so far been of limited success.' 
Public broadcasting11 has been one of the most promising at-
tempts to free television from restrictions of audience maximiza-
tion and commercial mediocrity.6 Unfortunately, public broad-
casting in its present form has not met that challenge. The 
Report of the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Public 
Broadcasting, released in early 1979, stated: "Sadly, we conclude 
• J. MACY, To IRRIGATE A WASTELAND ix (1974) (quoting Edward R. Murrow). 
I CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING, A PUBLIC TRUST 21 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE REPORT II]. 
• J. MACY, supra note 1, at 1. 
• See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("the broadcast me-
dia have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans."). See 
generally J. BLUMLER & D. McQuAIL, TELEVISION IN POLITICS: ITS LIES AND INFLUENCES 
(1969); K. LANG & G. LANG, POLITICS AND TELEVISION (1968); R. LIEBERT, J. NEALE & E. 
DAVIDSON, THE EARLY WINDOW: EFFECTS OF TELEVISION ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH (1973); 
R. MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE (1968); M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA (1965); 
J. McGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 (1969); TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BE-
HAVIOR: A TECHNICAL REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL'S SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMIT· 
TEE ON TELEVISION AND Soc1AL BEHAVIOR (5 vols., E. Rubenstein, G. Comstock & J. Mur-
ray, eds., 1972); F. WOLF, TELEVISION PROGRAMMING FOR NEWS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
(1972). 
• Due to the greater influence of television relative to radio, this article will generally 
focus on public television, although it is also applicable to public radio in most instances . 
• See R. BLAKELY, THE PEOPLE'S INSTRUMENT: A PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRAMMING FOR 
PUBLIC TELEVISION 34-48 (1971); J. MACY, supra note 1, at 2-4; CARNEGIE REPORT II, 
supra note 2, at 21-32, 295-301. 
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that the invention did not work, or at least not very well .... 
Hence, as public broadcasting enters its early adolescence, it suf-
fers from chronic underfunding, growing internal conflict, and a 
loss of a clear sense of purpose and direction. "7 Despite its 
strong criticism of the present system, 8 the Commission retains 
hope for the future of public broadcasting. 9 One area which the 
Commission found most in need of improvement is public affairs 
programming.10 A statutory restriction in the Public Broadcast-
ing Act of 196711 that prohibits public broadcasting licenseeslll 
7 CARNEGb: REPORT II, supra note 2, at 11, 25. 
• The Carnegie Commission called for a total restructuring of public broadcasting. 
Under its recommendation, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, see part I C infra, 
would be replaced by a new entity, the Public Telecommunications Trust. A separate 
organization, the Program Services Endowment, would be responsible for the underwrit-
ing and support of programming. The Commission's report calls for a substantial in-
crease in funding to $1.2 billion annually (570 million federal dollars). Federal funds 
would come from general tax revenues, offset by a fee on licensed use of the broadcast 
spectrum. Id. at 13-16. 
The Corporation for Public Broadcasting has recognized that changes are inevitable as 
a result of the new Carnegie Report and the attention being focused on public broadcast-
ing. The Corporation President, Robben Flemming, recently announced plans for inter-
nal reorganization of the Corporation into a management unit 1111d a program fund in an 
apparent attempt to avert more drastic changes from outside. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 
1979, § C, at 24, col. 1. 
• The Commission reflected: 
We see, instead, the reverent and the rude, the disciplined and the rambunc-
tious-a celebration of American freedom in all its unpredictable varieties. This 
revelation of diversity will not please some, notably the book burners and the 
dogmatists among us. It will startle and anger others, as well it should. But we 
have found in our own lives that anger yields to understanding .... 
We remember the Egyptians for the pyramids, and the Greeks for their grace-
ful stone temples. How shall Americans be remembered? As exporters of sensa-
tionalism and salaciousness? Or as builders of magical electronic tabernacles 
that can in an instant erase the limitations of time and geography, and make us 
into one people? 
The choice is in our hands and the time is now. 
CARNEGIE REPORT II, supra note 2, at 300-01. 
The principle of a system of public broadcasting has not been universally supported. 
See, e.g., B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM or EXPRESSION 123 (1975). "The intellectual 
community has never been happy with commercial television in the United States. The 
number of academics claiming that they never watch television is exceeded only by the 
number of antennae on their homes." Owen believes public broadcasting is an inefficient 
cure for the problems resulting from commercial network concentration because public 
broadcasting stations occupy valuable spectrum allocations with programs that attract 
"miniscule" audiences. Id. at 133. 
10 [T]here is one objective that public broadcasting must locate at its center of its 
activity if it is ever to be considered a mature voice in society. Public broadcast-
ing must have a strong editorial purpose. Without this strong editorial purpose 
expressed in diverse, even controversial ways, and without an ability to con-
struct a context for understanding the events that occur around us and the 
meaning .of history, public broadcasting will never be taken seriously. 
CARNEGIE REPORT II, supra note 2, at 29-30. 
11 Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967) (current version at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 390-399 
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from editorializing or supporting candidates for office18 has 
proven a major obstacle to the growth of public broadcasting 
into a mature voice of public affairs. 
This article contends that the public is deprived of an impor-
tant source of information on public affairs issues as a result of 
the section 399(a) prohibition on editorializing.14 After an exam-
ination of the legislative history of Section 399(a),16 and the her-
itage of broadcast regulation in the United States, 18 the article 
concludes that the prohibition on editorializing is an improper 
restriction on free expression in violation of the First 
Amendment.17 
I. THE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING 
A. The Early Years 
The roots of public broadcasting date back to 1919 when radio 
station 9XM began broadcasting from the University of Wiscon-
sin.18 Federal involvement in noncommercial broadcasting was 
limited during these early years. The Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) first reserved frequencies on the radio spec-
trum for educational radio in 1939.18 Television channels were 
not reserved for noncommercial and educational users until 
1945.20 A year later, television station KUHT of the University 
of Houston began broadcasting.21 
Most of the early licenses were assigned to educational institu-
(West Supp. 1979)). 
11 The Public Broadcasting Act does not explicitly define the term "public broadcast-
ing," though it defines "noncommercial educational broadcast station" to include (1) tel-
evision or radio stations eligible to be licensed by the FCC as noncommercial educational 
stations and which are owned and operated by a nonprofit private foundation, corpora-
tion, or association; and (2) stations owned and operated by municipalities which trans-
mit noncommercial educational programs. 47 U.S.C.A. § 397(6) (West. Supp. 1979). 
This article will refer to all public broadcasting stations, television and radio, as "pub-
lic licensees." 
11 47 U.S.C. § 399(a) (1976). This subsection states: "No noncommercial educational 
broadcasting station may engage in editorializing or may support or oppose any candi-
date for public office." 
14 See text accompanying notes 67-69 infra. 
10 See part II A infra. 
18 See part III A infra. 
17 "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. See part III B infra. 
18 S. FROST, EDUCATION'S OWN STATIONS 464 (1937). 
" 47 C.F.R. §§ 4.131-4.133 (1939). 
•• See 17 Fed. Reg. 4054-4059 (1952). 
11 J. MACY, supra note 1, at 10. 
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tions for instructional programming.22 As television became 
more popular, non-profit community organizations saw the po-
tential for new, non-instructional programming.28 These commu-
nity stations relied on diverse sources of funding including auc-
tions, private contributions, corporate underwriting, and 
foundation grants. In the 1950's, noncommercial stations re~ 
ceived strong funding and program support from the National 
Educational Television and Radio Center of the Ford Founda-
tion (NET).24 Funding problems remained critical, however, and 
most stations wer~ forced to limit their broadcasting time as a 
result.26 
The first direct government funding for public broadcasting 
did not take place until 1962 with the passage of the Educa-
tional Television Broadcasting Facilities Act.28 This Act author-
ized the expenditure of thirty-two million dollars for public tele-
vision over a five-year period, the spending to be controlled by 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).17 
Funding was limited to the purchase of equipment and the con-
struction of television facilities;28 funding of program production 
and operating costs thus remained a continuing problem.19 
B. The First Carnegie Report 
Against this background of serious underfunding for public 
television, the Carnegie Foundation created a private commis-
sion in 1965 to study the problems of noncommercial television. 
The Commission's landmark 1967 report80 (the Carnegie Report) 
set the pattern for current federal involvement in public televi-
sion. The Carnegie Report called for a new and broader mission 
for public television, bringing the immense power of television 
.. CARNEGIE REPORT II, supra note 2, at 34. 
•• Id. 
24 F. POWLEDGE, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A QUESTION OF SURVIVAL 3 (1972). 
•• J. MACY, supra note 1, at 44. 
•• Pub. L. No. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64 (1962). (current version at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 391-394, 
397-398 (West Supp. 1979)). 
27 Id., 76 Stat. 65 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 391 (West 1962)) (amended 1967, 1973, 
1976 & 1978). 
•• Id. (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 392 (West 1962)) (amended 1967, 1976 & 1978). 
•• In the early 1960's, the average public licensee had approximately $100,000 a year to 
spend on programming, an amount often spent by commercial networks for one-half 
hour of programming. See.Address by E. William Henry, International Radio and Tele· 
vision Society (Oct. 2, 1964), reprinted in PROBLEMS AND CONTROVERSIES IN TELEVISION 
AND RADIO 43, 47 (H. Skorhia & J. Kitson, eds., 1968). 
3° CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PROGRAM 
FOR ACTION (1967) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE REPORT I]. 
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technology "into the full service of man"31 in a way that com-
mercial constraints on television had made impossible. Recogniz-
ing that patterns of funding had left public broadcasting sta-
tions in "a daily struggle for survival,"32 the Commission saw the 
need for greatly expanded federal funding of public television. 83 
In calling for this expanded federal role, the Commission 
faced squarely the risk of increased governmental control of 
public television. To prevent this, the Commission recom-
mended that Congress create a nonprofit, non-governmental 
"Corporation for Public Television" to receive and disburse fed-
eral as well as private funds, to provide leadership for the sys-
tem, and to shield public broadcasters from improper govern-
mental and political pressure. a. The Commission also 
recommended the establishment of an excise tax on the sale of 
television sets to insulate the proposed Corporation from the po-
litical appropriations process. 311 
C. The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 
The Carnegie Report won widespread public approval and 
provided the impetus for the enactment of the Public Television 
Act of 1967. 38 The influence of the Carnegie Report can be seen 
throughout the resulting legislation, particularly in Title II, 
which created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB).87 
Some of the Report's recommendations, however, were not en-
acted, including the proposed excise tax. This decision left fund-
ing to periodic congressional appropriations, a system that con-
tinues to plague public broadcasting. 38 
11 Id. at 13 . 
.. Id. at 33. 
•• Id. at 3, 76-77, 135-91. 
14 Id. at 5, 36-37. 
16 Id. at 68. 
18 Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967) (current version at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 390-399 
(West Supp. 1979)). 
•• Title I extended the Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962. Title III author-
ized a study of instructional television by HEW. · 
18 See Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications for Public 
Broadcasting, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 1123, 1155 (1974); Chase, Public Broadcasting and the 
Problem of Government Influence: Towards a Legislative Solution, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 
64, 75 (1975). 
' Since 1967, three entities have been added to the public broadcasting system. The 
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) was formed in 1970 to operate the interconnection 
system, which distributes national programming to local public stations. The intercon-
nection system initially utilized common carrier facilities and since 1979 has used a satel-
lite system. PBS is governed by the local stations. Funding is provided by the CPB. See 
generally CARNEGIE REPORT II, supra note 2, at 40. 
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The Corporation is a nonprofit District of Columbia corpora-
tion governed by a fifteen-member Board of Directors, each of 
whom is appointed by the President subject to confirmation by 
the Senate.39 No more than eight of the directors may be mem-
bers of the same political party:'0 The Corporation's specific 
powers include raising and disbursing funds, conducting re-
search, arranging for an interconnection system, and encourag-
ing the creation of new noncommercial stations.41 The Corpora-
tion is granted the "usual powers" of a nonprofit District of 
Columbia corporation but is expressly prohibited from owning 
or operating any stations, networks, or interconnection facilities, 
producing programs, and from contributing to or supporting any 
candidate for office. •2 The Corporation is also required to follow 
a standard of "objectivity and balance" in all controversial pro-
grams. 43 Finally, section 399(a) of the Act prohibits noncommer-
cial licensees from editorializing or supporting or opposing can-
didates for political office. 44 
JI. THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING EDITORIALIZING BAN 
One of the basic themes of the Carnegie Report, that local sta-
tions must be the bedrock of the public television system,411 is 
National Public Radio (NPR), established in 1970, performs a similar function for 
public stations. As with PBS, NPR operates the interconnection system with funding 
from the CPB. In addition, it directly produces programming for its member stations. 
See generally CARNEGIE REPORT II, supra note 2, at 40. 
Local stations were given greater control over national programming independent of 
the CPB when the PBS established the Station Program Cooperative (SPC) in 1974 with 
support from the CPB and the Ford Foundation. The SPC selects and provides funding 
for many public affairs programs formerly under the exclusive control of the CPB. See 
generally CARNEGIE REPORT II, supra note 2, at 47-48. 
•• 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(b), (c)(l) (West Supp. 1979). 
•• Id. § 396(c)(l). 
41 Id. § 396(g). 
•• Id. § 396(g)(3), (0(3). 
•• The CPB is authorized to provide programs to "telecommunications entities" with 
"strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of a 
controversial nature." Id. § 396(g)(l)(a). This standard is generally considered stricter 
than the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976), which requires broadcasters to pro-
vide for the discussion of conflicting views on controversial subjects. See Note, "Balance 
and Objectivity" in Public Broadcasting: Fairer than Fair?, 61 VA. L. REV. 643, 653-59 
(1975). The fairness doctrine also requires broadcasters to offer air time to individuals 
personally attacked or editorially opposed by the station. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910, 73.1920, 
73.1930 (1979). See also Accuracy in Media v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (af-
firming an FCC ruling that it has no power to enforce 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(l)(a); the provi-
sion provides only a set of goals to which the CPB should aspire, controlled only by 
congressional oversight) . 
.. 47 U.S.C.A. § 399(a) (West Supp. 1979). 
•• CARNEGIE REPORT I, supra note 30, at 33-35, 46-52. 
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evident throughout the Public Broadcasting Act. The Act's dec-
laration of policy states that the development of public broad-
casting is in the public interest; that expansion of diverse pro-
gramming depends on "freedom, imagination, and initiative" at 
both the local and national levels; and that the CPB should en-
courage the development of public broadcasting and "afford 
maximum protection from extraneous interference and 
control. "46 
Section 398 of the Act explicitly prohibits federal interference 
or control. 47 Even before the passage of the Act, moreover, sec-
tion 326 prohibited any censorship of stations by the FCC. 48 The 
section 399(a) ban on editorializing is the only major restriction 
on local licensees contained in the Act.0 The legislative history 
of Section 399(a) must be examined to understand why this 
seemingly inconsistent provision was added. 
A. Legislative History 
The legislative history of Section 399(a) is limited. Neither the 
Johnson Administration proposal110 nor the Senate version111 of 
•• 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(a)(l), (3), (7) (West Supp. 1979). 
•• Nothing contained in sections 390 to 399 of this title shall be deemed . . . to 
authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to 
exercise any direction, supervision, or control over public telecommunica-
tions .... 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any department, 
agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, super-
vision, or control over the content or distribution of public telecommunications 
programs and services. 
Id. § 398(a), (c). 
•• Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commis-
sion the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmit-
ted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or 
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by 
means of radio communication. 
47 u.s.c. § 326 (1976). 
Though not explicitly amended after the development of television, § 326 has been 
presumed applicable. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers & 
Distributors v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1975) (television prime time access rule con-
sistent with § 326 and First Amendment). 
•• Another restriction, that noncommercial licensees must retain audio recordings of 
each of its broadcasts of controversial programs, 47 U.S.C.A. § 399(b) (West Supp. 1979), 
was added to the Act in 1973. Act of Aug. 6, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-84, § 2, 87 Stat. 219 
(1973). That requirement was found unconstitutional in Community-Service Broadcast-
ing of Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and has since been 
deleted by the FCC. See generally part III B infra. The only other restrictions on local 
licensees in the Act are that they must keep financial records and undergo an annual 
audit, 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(g)(3)(b) (West Supp. 1979), and adhere to equal opportunity in 
employment. Id. § 398(b)(l). 
•• Johnson, Special Message to Congress: Education and Health in America, 1967 Pus. 
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the Public Broadcasting Act contained a prohibition on editori-
alizing. The ban was first added in the House version of the 
bill. 112 The Report of the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce stated that there was considerable testimony 
that no noncommercial station editorialized and that the prohi-
bition was added "out of abundance of caution."63 The commit-
tee found the ban consistent with the section 396 objectivity and 
balance requirement; the report emphasized that the provision 
was "not intended to preclude balanced, fair and objective 
presentations. "M In joint conference, the Senate conferees ac-
cepted the House ban, explaining their action in language simi-
lar to the House Report's, adding that the ban was understood 
only to preclude stations from representing the opinion of the 
station management.11& 
Supporters of the -legislation stated that section 399(a) was 
one of several provisions of the Public Broadcasting Act added 
as a safeguard to prevent the CPB from "becoming a propa-
ganda agency for either political party or from presenting only a 
particular point of view."H Examination of the congressi9nal 
hearings, however, suggests an additional motive. The Commit-
tee was inaccurate in reporting that there was testimony that no 
noncommercial station editorialized.67 One of the Committee's 
most important witnesses, then-Secretary of HEW, John Gard-
ner, testified that public stations do editorialize, though he was 
unaware of any stations endorsing political candidates. 68 The 
House floor debate reveals that the reason for the prohibition 
may have been less a congressional concern over government 
propagandizing and more a fear of the power of television on the 
personal political survival of many congressmen. 69 This debate 
p APERS 244, 250. 
01 S. 1160, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
•• H.R. · 6736, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1967). 
•• H.R. REP. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sesa., reprinted in [1967) U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 1799, 1810. 
04 Id . 
.. CoNF. REP. No. 794, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967) U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 1834, 1835. See note 65 and accompanying text infra for FCC interpretation . 
.. 1967 C.Q. ALMANAC 1042. 
07 H.R. REP. No. 572, supra note 53, at 1810 . 
.. Hearings on H.R. 6746 and S. 1160 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1967). 
•• The debate was almost unanimously critical of editorializing by the media. Con-
gresaman Springer felt that neither commercial nor noncommercial stations should be 
able to endorse candidates. Springer felt Congress should "close this loophole now." 113 
CONG. REC. 26388 (1967). Congressman Joelson, apparently referring to the recently an-
nounced decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), asserted that 
public officials were "sitting ducks." He stated, "the right of editorializing should be 
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suggests that the true reason for the, inclusion of section 399(a) 
was to win the support of reluctant congressmen who feared the 
potential criticism of public broadcasters. 80 
B. FCC Interpretation 
1. Commercial editorializing-The FCC originally decreed 
that all editorializing was contrary to the public interest. In 
1940, the FCC held in Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation that 
"[a] truly free radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of the 
licensee."81 The FCC cautiously reversed that _decision nine 
years later in .its report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licen-
sees. 82 The report stated that overt editorializing by broadcast-
ers, which had subsequently become subject to the general re-
quirements of fairness, is not contrary to the public interest.88 
Since those early years of broadcasting, the FCC has taken a 
more favorable view of editorializing by commercial broadcast-
ers. In fact, the FCC has considered a station's presentation of 
editorials as a positive factor in license applications and 
renewals. 84 
2. Section 399(a)-The FCC has interpreted section 399(a) to 
preclude only those editorials on public broadcast stations which 
are by licensees, their management, or those speaking on their 
behalf. 811 Station employees, for instance, may express their per-
very, very carefully scrutinized." 113 CONG. REc. 26391 (1967). Congressman McClure 
foresaw public television stations "crusad[ing) for my opponent in next year's election" if 
public licensees were given the power to editorialize and endorse candidates. Id. at 
26399. 
80 Lindsey, Public Broadcasting: Editorial Restraints and the First Amendment, 28 
FED. CoM. B.J. 63, 81 (1975); Toohey, Section 399: The Constitution Giveth and Con· 
gress Taketh Away, 6 Enuc. BROADCASTING REv. 31, 34 (1972): "(T]he purpose of Sectioq 
399 was clear: to prevent Congress from creating a monster that might someday turn on 
its creator. Therefore, to achieve its own self-protective ends Congress simply legislated 
away a significant part of educational broadcasters' right of free speech." 
" 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940). 
41 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). 
ea Id. at 1253 . 
.. The FCC formally recognized the importance of editorializing in its 1960 policy re-
port on programming. The Commission included as one of fourteen programming ele-
ments necessary to serve the needs of the community, "(7) editorialization by licensees." 
25 Fed. Reg. 7295 (1960). Cf. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1969) (applicant which 
would be o~ed by a charitable foundation which had IRS restrictions limiting ability to 
editorialize were assessed a slight demerit); RKO General, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 149, 219 
(1969) (station's failure to editorialize "runs squarely athwart Commission policy"); Eve-
ning Star Broadcast Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 316, 332 (1971) ("noteworthy is the fact that the 
licensee has regularly editorialized . . . on matters of immediate concern to all residents 
of the District"). 
16 Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 302 (1973). 
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sonal views on public issues as long as they make clear that they 
are not expressing the views of the station. 66 
Even as interpreted by the FCC, however, section 399(a) in-
hibits an important area of free expression. Public broadcasters 
do not have the right, as their commercial counterparts have, to 
take public stands on issues of political importance. The nega-
tive effects of this prohibition go beyond the infringement of the 
broadcaster's rights. The viewing public is denied an importance 
voice, particularly on local issues. As might be expected, the fre-
quency and quality of commercial editorializing has not been 
overwhelming,67 because of concern for the alienation of spon-
sors. 68 Public broadcasting thus remains a largely untapped 
source for more extensive and meaningful editorializing.69 
"" Walker & Salveter, 32 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 839 (1975). 
87 Despite the reversal of the FCC policy against editorializing, see note 62 and accom-
panying text supra, there was little immediate experimentation by commercial stations 
with their new editorial freedom. In fact, the first editorials were not broadcast by local 
stations but rather by the CBS television network. F. WOLF, supra note 4, at 88. Most 
local stations did not begin even limited editorializing independently of the networks 
until the early 1960's. Id. (citing w. Wooo, ELECTRONIC JOURNALISM 62 (1967)). The level 
of commercial editorializing remains negligible today. In 1976, a nationwide survey found 
that only 58.3% of commercial television stations editorialize. Of those which editorial-
ize, 57.8% did so less than once per week. BROADCASTING YEARBOOK C-300 (1976). 
88 The Carnegie Commission stated: 
The United States is the only Western nation relying so exclusively upon adver-
tising effectiveness as the gatekeeper of its broadcasting activities. The conse-
quences of using the public spectrum primarily for commercial purposes are nu-
merous, and increasingly disturbing. The idea of broadcasting as a force in the 
public interest, a display case for the best of America's creative arts, a forum of 
public debate-advancing the democratic conversation and enhancing the public 
imagination-has receded before the inexorable force of audience maximization. 
CARNEGIE REPORT II, supra.note 2, at 21-22. See also F. Wolf, supra note 4, at 137-38. 
•• There has been no comprehensive study of the feelings of public licensees toward 
editorializing. A 1975 survey restricted to public radio station managers found, however, 
that public licensees generally thought editorializing on their stations would provide a 
positive public service resulting in no social or political harm. D. Feingold, Section 399 of 
the Communications Act of 1934: A Legal and Quantitative Study of the Prohibition of 
Broadcast Editorials on Non-Commercial Educational Broadcasting 122-23 (May, 1975) 
(unpublished Masters of Arts thesis, Central Missouri State University). One station 
manager commented: "Since commercial stations are afraid to editorialize on anything 
more controversial than jaywalking, it falls upon the public broadcaster to provide this 
forum of information." Id. at 123. 
If § 399(a) is found unconstitutional or is deleted by Congress, the response of public 
licensees will be difficult to predict. One important external factor on their decision to 
editoralize, which is applicable to nonprofit "community" licensees only, is the tax laws. 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 exempts from federal income 
taxation: 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and op-
erated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, 
literary, or educational purposes, ... or for the prevention of cruelty to children 
or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which 
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ~ECTION 399( a) 
A. Broadcasting and the First Amendment 
In recent years, courts have faced the problems raised by the 
claims of powerful media interests in interpreting the First 
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, 
. . . and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publish-
ing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any can-
didate for public office. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1979) (emphasis supplied). The loss of tax deductibility of contribu-
tions from the general public to public stations under the federal income tax, id. §§ 170 
& 642(c) (1978), estate tax, id. §§ 2055 & 2106(a)(2) (1978), and gift tax, id. § 2527 
(1978), all of which incorporate the 501(c)(3) requirements, would be of even greater 
importance. 
Concern over the loss of exempt status from editorializing would seem unwarranted, 
either under the substantial lobbying and propaganda activity limitation or under the 
political campaign activity limitation. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has never 
found a nonprofit organization's lobbying or propagandizing activities "substantial" 
where only minimal effort and expense was involved. See Whalen, Political Activities of 
Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, 29 S. CAL. TAX. INSTIT. 195, 205 (1977). Editorials by 
nonprofit "community" licensees, even if broadcast on a regular basis, would not seem to 
·constitute a "substantial" part of the station's "total activities" as required by § 
501(c)(3). In addition, a nonprofit organization can now elect to have its political expend-
itures judged under the new objective § 501(i) test. This alternative test utilizes a sliding 
scale of permissible political expenditures calculated as a percentage of the organiza-
tion's total exempt expenditures. See id. at 215-21. 
Of greater importance is the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) prohibition of activity in political cam-
paigns, including the making of statements. This prohibition, unlike the substantial leg-
islative or propaganda limitation, is absolute. The courts and the IRS have not, however, 
applied it literally. The IRS has not taken action so long as the campaign activity consti-
tutes only a subsidiary objective of an organization's activities. See P. TREuscH & N. 
SUGARMAN, TAX-EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 168 (1979). This flexible interpreta-
tion would be necessary if § 399(a) were deleted and the IRS were faced with the editori-
alizing about or endorsing of candidates by nonprofit "community" licensees. The Fed-
eral Elections Campaign Act of 1971, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976), which is applicable to 
all broadcasters, threatens the revocation of a station's license "for willful or repeated 
failure to allow reasonable access" to candidates for federal office. This obligation is in 
direct conflict with the § 501(c)(3) political campaign activity prohibition. Most likely 
the IRS would be forced to treat political editorializing by nonprofit "community" licen-
sees as an exception to § 501(c)(3). See D. TOOHEY, R. MARKS & A. LuRAKER, LEGAL 
PROBLEMS IN BROADCASTING 152 (1974). 
Some commentators argue that the denial of any organization's exempt status as a 
result of its engaging in political activity is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Troyer, Charities, 
Law-Making, and the Constitution: The Validity of the Restrictions on Influencing 
Legislation, 71 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 1415 (1973); Note, Political Speech of Charita· 
ble Organizations under the Internal Revenue Code, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 352 (1974). To 
date, the courts have been unreceptive. See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 
498, 513 (1959) (upholding as consistent with the First Amendment nondiscriminatory 
denial of income tax deduction for expenditures to promote or defeat legislation); Has-
well v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1148 (Ct. CJ. 1974) (denial of tax deduction for 
contributions to association formed to preserve passenger railroad service; "[t]he exercise 
of the freedom of speech is not free from taxation."). 
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Amendment. 70 These problems are difficult because First 
Amendment theory developed in response to altogether different 
concerns.71 In no other area has the Supreme Court responded 
with as striking a deviation from traditional First Amendment 
principles as in its attempts to fashion coherent standards for 
the broadcasting medium.71 The Court has recognized that 
broadcasting is a medium with First Amendment rights and has 
attempted to formulate First "Amendment standards which vary 
according to the characteristics of that medium.78 The Court has 
justified the application of less rigorous First Amendment stan-
dards to broadcasting regulation than to the traditional print 
medium because "[u]nlike other modes of expression, radio in-
herently is not available to all."7' The "scarcity doctrine"711 un-
derlying the Court's treatment of broadcasting is based on the 
premise that the electromagnetic broadcast spectrum is a valua-
ble public resource in scarce supply. Without government regu-
10 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecent language on 
radio); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (gag rules); Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (access to paid tele-
vision advertising); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (newsman's privilege and 
grand jury subpoenas); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (prior 
restraint on publication of "Pentagon Papers"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367 (1969) (television fairness doctrine). 
71 "(T]he First Amendment was not really subjected to judicial interpretation and ra-
tionalization until just after World War I, and then the principle claimants of First 
Amendment rights were relatively powerless people-anarchists, socialists, and syndical-
ists." Blasi, Journalistic Autonomy as a First Amendment Concept, in IN HONOR or 
JUSTICE DOUGLAS: A SYMPOSIUM ON INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND THE ENVIRONMENT 555, 567 
(R. Keller ed. 1979) (citing, i.e., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
See also Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDA-
TION RESEARCH J. 523, 523 (1977) ("The theory underlying a clause of the Constitution 
often depends more on the claims that have been pressed over the years in the name of 
the clause than on the grievances and value judgments that originally induced its 
adoption."). 
1
• See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) ("And of all forms of 
communications, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment 
protection."). - -
70 Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 307 (1969), with Miami Her-
ald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Tornillo Court struck down a 
state equal reply statute applicable to newspapers without even citing Red Lion, which 
had upheld a similar provision, the television fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). 
Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) (statute authorizing denial 
of license to "sacriligious" motion pictures held void; "[e]ach method [of expression] 
tends to present its own peculiar problems."). 
74 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (FCC chain 
broadcasting rules under power of Communications Act of 1934 do not violate First 
Amendment). 
70 The Supreme Court first expressed the scarcity doctrine in National Broadcasting 
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1943). 
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lation, overcrowding of the spectrum would supposedly result in 
signal interference and chaos. 76 When many who wish to utilize 
the airwaves must be excluded, the argument concludes, those 
who are licensed to use the airwaves must act as a fiduciary to 
the general public. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, 
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. "77 
This fiduciary role subjects broadcasting licensees to numer-
ous requirements inapplicable to their print counterparts. 
Broadcasters must apply for a license before using the air-
waves;78 they must provide equal time to political candidates;79 
and they must adhere to the fairness doctrine by providing for 
the discussion of conflicting views on controversial subjects80 and 
offering air time to individuals personally attacked or editorially 
opposed by the station. 81 
Whether the scarcity of available airwave space was ever more 
than a fiction is unclear, but technological advances such as the 
creation of the UHF portion of the spectrum and cable televi-
sion render it an unconvincing rationale today. 82 A more persua-
sive explanation for these different First Amendment standards 
can be found in two elements of the historical development of 
broadcasting. First, there existed a belief that broadcasting was 
primarily an entertainment medium and only secondarily a 
source of serious news programming needing full First Amend-
ment protection. 88 Second, the history of broadcasting regulation 
lacks an instance of outrageous government injustice which has 
•• Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) ("Where there are 
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allo-
cate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable 
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish."). 
77 Id. at 390 . 
•• 47 u.s.c. § 301 (1976). 
•• Id. § 315(a). 
80 Id. 
81 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910, 73.1920, 73.1930 (1979). 
81 See, e.g., Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE 
L.J. 213, 223; Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of 
Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1, 6-9 (1976). Despite rejection 
of the scarcity doctrine, Bollinger supports differential treatment of broadcasting and 
newspapers at least as far as access regulation is concerned. He feels this achieves the 
positive benefits of access in a highly concentrated medium with minimal erosion of First 
Amendment tradition and need for government intervention. See also B. OWEN, supra 
note 9, at 103-07 ("The spectrum is not in 'scarce supply' to any greater extent than 
steel, plastics, or pencils." Id. at 107.); Note, Regulation of Indecency in Political Broad-
casting, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69 (1979). 
•• See Bazelon, supra note 82, at 219 ("The main factor in my mind that explains the 
different First Amendment regime applied to TV and radio is the lack of genuine jour-
nalistic effort in the beginning of telecommunications news."). 
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forced the courts to respond with countervailing safeguards.84 
B. Section 399(a) and the First Amendment811 
Although broadcasters are subject to regulation in the public 
interest, the Court has never suggested that government censor-
ship is tolerable. On the contrary, the Court's rationale for al-
lowing broadcast regulation has been to maximize the number of 
voices to serve the public's right to be informed.88 The damage 
to the public is particularly acute under section 399(a) because 
the broadcasting medium has become the dominant force in 
public affairs today.87 
Protection of uninhibited discussion of public affairs is at the 
core of the First Amendment.88 In Mills v. Alabama,89 the Su-
" Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. L. & EcoN. 
15, 18 (1967): 
If one reviews the legal developments under the Radio Act of 1927 and the Com-
munications Act of 1934, one cannot quite suppress the feeling that what is lack-
ing is one good case of injustice by government-which has been corrected by 
the courts. What broadcasting has needed is its own Zenger case. 
See also note 71 and accompanying text supra. 
80 A case challenging the constitutionality of § 399(a) was recently dismissed, League 
of Women Voters of Cal. v. FCC, No. CV 79-1562 mml (PX) (C.D. Cal.) (March 14, 1980) 
(on file with UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM). Three plaintiffs main-
tained standing: the Pacifica Foundation as the owner of several California public radio 
stations because it was denied the right to editorialize about political candidates and 
public issues; the League of Women Voters; and Congressman Henry Waxman (D-Cal.), 
the latter two plaintiffs representing all listeners and viewers who were denied access to 
information and opinion on public issues. The suit, seeking to strike § 399(a) on First 
Amendment as well as Fifth Amendment equal protection grounds, was dismissed for 
lack of ripeness. See N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1980, § 1, at 21, col. 5. 
88 It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance 
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a pri-
vate licensee .... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, 
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. 
This right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the 
FCC. 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (citations omitted). 
87 "In terms of the role of free speech in the functioning of a system of self-govern-
ment, radio and television broadcasting have taken the place of the stump and the soap 
box in 1791." Kalven, supra note 84, at 15 (quoting John Pemberton, former Executive 
Director of the ACLU). 
88 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) ("The first amendment affords the 
broadest protection to political expression [as to public issues and qualifications of can-
didates for office.]"); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (striking down 
recovery for libel against newspaper by political candidate; "it can hardly be doubted 
that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to 
the conduct of campaigns for political office"); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 270 (1964) (striking down libel recovery of public official where there was no proof 
of actual malice; "the central meaning of the First Amendment" is a "profound national 
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preme Court struck down an Alabama statute prohibiting a 
newspaper from editorializing on election day, finding it "diffi-
cult to conceive of a more obvious and flagrant abridgement of 
the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press."90 Govern-
ment suppression of free expression is "presumptively at odds 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide open, and that it may well include vehement . . . attacks on government and 
public officials."). 
See generally A. MEIKLE.JOHN, PoLmCAL FREEDOM (2d ed. 1960) (though championing 
an absolute guarantee of First Amendment rights, Meiklejohn defines the ambit of the 
Amendment to political speech in furtherance of self-government); Bork, Neutral Princi-
ples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (limiting the scope of 
First Amendment protection to "explicitly political" speech advocating change through 
democratic processes); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, supra 
note 71 (emphasizing the "checking value" of the First Amendment, arguing that the 
preeminent concern of the First Amendment framers-to check abuses of power by pub-
lic officials-remains paramount today). 
Section 399(a) violates the First Amendment under the rationale of any of these three 
theories of the First Amendment. Political editorializing by public licensees would cer-
tainly further the informed electorate necessary for Meiklejohn's vision of self-govern-
ment. Although Bork may argue for a very narrow area of First Amendment protection, 
his theory would also afford full protection to the speech abridged by § 399(a). Political 
editorials are "explicitly political," which Bork defines to include "evaluation, criticism, 
electioneering and propaganda" directed at changing "governmental behavior, policy or 
personnel" through majoritarian processes. Bork, supra, at 27-28. Because of the vested 
power of political elites, moreover, the "checking value" suggests the need for an organ-
ized, countervailing elite force, a role best suited for the professional press. Blasi, supra 
at 524. On the other hand, the ultimate failure of the checking value, the rise of a totali-
tarian state, would threaten most if government were able "to gain complete control of 
the channels of mass communication." Id. at 542. The public broadcasting system is 
structured to prevent government control, see notes 107-110 and accompanying text in-
fra, and the existence of strong commercial networks eliminates the danger of govern-
ment controlling all mass communications. Public broadcasters have been critical of gov-
ernment abuses in the past, see note 113 infra, and would be more effective with the 
power to editorialize. The checking value theory of the First Amendment thus supports 
the freedom to editorialize for public broadcasting. 
•• 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
00 Id. at 219. The Court continued: 
Id. 
[T]he press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any 
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means 
for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom 
they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or 
criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, 
which is all that the editorial did, muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers 
of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society 
and keep it free. 
Though Mills involved a newspaper editorial, dicta in Red Lion suggested that the 
Supreme Court would reach the same result in the broadcasting context. "There is no 
question here of the Commission's refusal to permit the broadcaster to carry a particular 
program or to publish his own views . . . . Such questions would raise more serious 
First Amendment issues." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 367, 396 (1969) 
(emphasis added). 
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with the [F]irst [A]mendment."91 Courts have imposed the 
strictest of scrutiny on such infringements. Unless the statute 
involves speech not fully protected by the First Amendment,92 
or the suppression is essential to further a compelling govern-
ment interest,93 the statute or governmental action will be found 
constitutionally defective. On its face, section 399(a) prohibits 
speech on the basis of content-only speech expressing the sta-
tion's opinions on issues of public importance and on political 
candidates is regulated. But, "[t]he First Amendment means 
that government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."94 The 
speech prohibited by section 399(a), editorials and support of 
political candidates, is clearly protected by the First Amend-
ment;911 the statute can therefore be upheld only if there is a 
91 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 581 (1978) . 
.. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476 (1957) (same); Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting 
words); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation). 
•• See note 96 infra. 
•• Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (ordinance barring nonlabor picketing 
near school buildings violates equal protection since there is no compelling governmental 
interest to justify a classification affecting First Amendment interests). 
Cf. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content; The Peculiar Case of Sub-
ject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978). Professor Stone notes the Court's 
differentiation between content-neutral restrictions that restrict communications without 
regard to their message and content-based restrictions that restrict communications on 
the basis of their message. Stone advocates the recognition of a third category, subject-
matter restrictions that restrict communication of an entire subject, as opposed to re-
strictions placed upon a specific viewpoint or idea. Under Stone's suggested framework, § 
399(a) would fit under this new category because a general subject matter, editorializing 
by station management, would be completely prohibited without regard to the specific 
viewpoint expressed. Stone recognizes, however, that the Court has yet to follow this 
approach. For instance, Stone would classify Mosley as a subject-matter case. The Court 
in Mosley, however, while recognizing the subject-matter nature of the Chicago ordi-
nance, "proceeded on the assumption that subject-matter restrictions are to be treated 
no differently from other sorts of content-based restrictions." Id. at 86. 
•• See notes 87-90 and accompanying text supra. 
Because § 399(a) was enacted by Congress to prohibit all editorializing by public licen-
sees, it does not have all of the technical elements of a classic prior restraint in which the 
power to censor speech resides in an ad hoc administrative or judicial decisionmaker. 
Nevertheless, § 399(a) has the most fundamental attribute of a prior restraint on expres-
sion: an official restriction imposed upon speech in advance of publication of broadcast. 
One of the basic goals of the framers of the First Amendment was to prevent a recur-
rence in this country of the system of licensing in England which required the approval 
of state or church authorities before publication. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior 
Restraint, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 648, 652 (1955). First Amendment doctrine reflects 
this goal. Any "system of prior restraints comes to this Court bearing a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 
(1963) (striking down informal blacklisting which censored and inhibited the circulation 
of publications). Recent cases have reaffirmed the continued vitality of the doctrine. See, 
e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (pretrial gag order); Southeast-
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compelling governmental interest for the ban. 98 
The actual reason for the passage of section 399(a) suggested 
by its legislative history, congressional fear of criticism,87 is far 
from a compelling state interest and of questionable legiti· 
macy.98 Even if one. were to accept as true the stated congres· 
ern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (ban on musical "Hair" from munic-
ipal auditorium); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (injunction 
preventing peaceful distribution of leaflets). 
See generally Near v. Minnesota,.283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statute permitting abatement of 
"malicious, scandalous, and defamatory" newspapers invalidated); Barnett, The Puzzle 
of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539 (1977); Murphey, The Prior Restraint Doctrine 
in the Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 898 (1978). 
"' See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (striking down re-
strictions on corporate expenditures to influence referendum proposals because there was 
no compelling state interest to justify the infringement on freedom of speech). The 
"compelling interest" standard is a very strict one. One author stated that "sightings of 
compelling interests have been rarer than sightings of abominable snowmen. . . . " 
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 
61 (1976). 
Content-based restrictions cannot be justified by the claim that the expression has 
been voiced in another time, place, or manner, or expressed by another speaker. L. 
TRIBE, supra note 91, at 603. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) 
(conviction for placing peace symbol on American flag not justified by argument that 
views could be expressed by "other means"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976) (striking down state ban on 
prescription drug price advertising for infringing First Amendment rights of consumers 
to information; no justification that consumers could obtain information from other 
sources). Restrictions on broadcasting speech because of its content have been upheld 
only where they have been found necessary for the protection of children or where the 
material has been deemed patently offensive. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 
(1978) (upholding FCC ruling that it has power to regulate radio broadcasts that are 
indecent but not obscene). The Court has allowed these exceptions due to the "uniquely 
pervasive presence" of broadcasting which is "uniquely accessible" to children and un-
willing listeners. See also Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 
1971), aff'd sub nom Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 
(1972) (upholding prohibition on television cigarette advertising because of the greater 
influence of commercials in the electronic media on children). 
07 See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra. 
08 The Court has been sensitive to the importance of the legislative motive behind 
statutes restricting free expression. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) 
(striking down a statute prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public 
schools because true motive was to establish a religious viewpoint); Grosjean v. American 
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking Louisiana tax on large newspapers published in 
the state because motivation was to penalize newspapers critical of state government and 
Huey Long regime). The Court has recognized, however, the inherent difficulty in ascer-
taining the dominant legislative motive behind the passage of a statute. "What motivates 
one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores 
of others to enact it .... " United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) (upholding 
conviction for violation of statute prohibiting destruction of draft registration certifi-
cates). The Court's rationale for not inquiring into the legislative motivation behind the 
statute in O'Brien would not extend to a case challenging § 399(a) because in O'Brien 
the Court was unwilling only to "void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, consti-
tutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said 
about it." Id. (emphasis added). See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Mo-
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sional rationale for the ban, the prevention of governmental 
propagandizing,99 such a rationale is unsupported and fails to 
provide a compelling interest to justify this infringement on pro-
tected speech. Section 399(a) is directed at diverse local stations 
which are unlikely to speak in a single, monolithic voice, much 
less the voice of the government or a political party. Only thirty 
percent of public television stations are owned by states or mu-
nicipalities. Another thirty-two percent are owned by universi-
ties and school systems. Thirty-eight percent are owned by pri-
vate, nonprofit "community" organizations whose only 
connection with the federal government is the acceptance of par-
tial federal funding. 100 Though all public television stations re-
ceive partial federal funding through the CPB, eight hundred 
public radio stations receive no federal support whatsoever .101 
Overall, federal funding provided orily 27 .3 percent of the total 
public broadcasting funding for fiscal year 1977 .102 Licensee ac-
ceptance of this level of federal funding, channelled through the 
CPB, is insufficient to present a danger of public licensees be-
coming a propaganda arm of the federal government. Any argu-
ment that section 399(a) is a necessary safeguard to prevent gov-
ernment control over public broadcasting and their editorial 
statements is particularly tenuous in light of the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo.1°8 In upholding the public 
campaign fund for presidential candidates of the Presidential 
Election Campaign Fund Act of 1971, 104 the Court dismissed the 
concern that this public funding could lead to governmental con-
trol of political parties and a resulting loss of political freedom 
as "wholly speculative and hardly a basis for invalidation of the 
tivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). 
" See notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra. 
100 CPB Management Information Systems, June, 1979. 
State and municipally-owned stations in this discussion will be referred to as "state" 
licensees to distinguish them from private, nonprofit stations, which will be called "com-
munity" licensees. Although a community licensee might not be immune from all local 
political pressures, greater control could certainly be asserted over a state licensee owned 
and run by a government entity than over an independent community licensee. Stations 
owned by state universities and school systems present an intermediate situation. While 
owned by a governmental entity, the relationship of the university or school broadcasting 
organization to the state and local governmental powers may vary considerably. 
101 CARNEGIE REPORT II, supra note 2, at 29 (citing FCC Listings, Sept. 1978). The 
ownership of CPB-recognized public radio stations receiving federal funds is: univer-
sity-63%; community-21 %; local municipalities-11 %; and state-5%. CPB Manage-
ment Information Systems, June 1979. 
10
• Total 1977 public broadcasting income was $416,548,000. Federal funds provided 
$113,729,000, or 27.3%, of that amount. See CARNEGIE REPORT II, supra note 2, at 341. 
10
• 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See generally Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
... 26 u.s.c. §§ 9001-9012, 9031-9042 (1976). 
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public financing scheme on its face. "1011 
Furthermore, even if the fear of government propagandizing 
by public licensees were legitimate, Congress should solve this 
problem in a way that least restricts First Amendment values.106 
The congressional decision to ban all editorializing through sec-
tion 399(a) is an unacceptable solution because Congress has in 
fact already built sufficient safeguards into the public broadcast-
ing system to prevent government control. The basic structure 
of public broadcasting was designed to prevent just such 
abuse. 107 The CPB was explicitly created as an independent 
body to "afford maximum protection to such broadcasting from 
extraneous interference and control. "108 If any editorial abuses 
were to occur, the fairness doctrine109 and the equal time provi-
sion110 are proper remedies. If the adverse consequences feared 
can be averted by more speech, then more speech is man-
dated.111 Governmental suppression 1s "conclusively" un-
necessary.112 
1•• 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.126. 
'°" See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) ("The state must further some 
vital governmental end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and asso-
ciation in achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitu-
tionally protected rights"); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973) ("If the State has 
open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests it may not choose a 
legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties"); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("Precision of regulation must be the touch-
stone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms."). See generally Note, 
Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969). 
icn See part I C supra. 
108 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(a)(6) (West Supp. 1979). 
,.., 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910, 73.1920, 73.1930 (1979). See notes 
80-81 and accompanying text supra. 
11
• 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). See note 79 and accompanying text supra . 
... See Van Alystyne, The First Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering 
Propaganda in the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 
530, 535 (1966) ("[T)he remedy of silence is not the way of the First Amendment"). 
111 L. TRIBE, supra note 91, at 603. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (The choice between "the dan-
gers of suppressing information and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available [is a 
choice) that the First Amendment makes for us."). 
If Congress believes the fairness doctrine and the equal time provision constitute in-
sufficient protection against editorial abuses, it should impose a greater duty to provide 
access to opposing viewpoints rather than the wholesale restriction on free expression 
presently found in § 399(a). See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcasters have no duty to provide access to persons wish-
ing to buy commercial time for editorial advertisements urging controversial positions). 
Justice Douglas indicated that he would find a right of access for public broadcasters: 
.If these cases involved [the CPB] we would have a situation comparable to that 
in which the United States owns and manages a prestigious newspaper .... The 
Government as owner and manager would not, as I see it, be free to pick and 
choose such news items as it desired. For by the First Amendment it may not 
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Although there is arguably no basis for the fear that editorial-
izing by public licensees would result in propagandizing by the 
federal government, 118 a more legitimate concern is that a state 
or municipally-owned licensee would come under the control of 
local political forces. This argument does not validate section 
399(a), however, because section 399(a) is not limited to "state" 
licensees but is applicable to all public licensees including "com-
munity" licensees.114 At the very least, therefore, section 399(a) 
is defectively overbroad.1111 Even if section 399(a) were amended 
censor or enact or enforce any other "law" abridging freedom of the press. Polit-
ics, ideological slants, rightist or leftist tendencies could play no part in its de-
sign of programs .... More specifically,- the programs tendered by the respon-
dents in the present cases could not then he turned down. 
Id. at 149-50 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result). But see Canby, supra note 38, at 
1124 (criticism of the Douglas dicta, stating that public broadcasters must inevitably 
edit). 
118 See notes 99-105 and accompanying text, supra. The major controversy public 
broadcasting has in fact faced is not the charge of pro-government propagandizing hut 
rather that of anti-administration bias. The bitter dispute between the Nixon adminis-
tration and public broadcasting culminated with Nixon's veto of a two-year, $155 million 
appropriation to the CPB in 1972. See Richard Nixon, Veto of Public Broadcasting Bill, 
1972 PuB. PAPERS 718, 718-19. Patrick Buchanan, a Nixon speechwriter, articulated the 
administration view on a television talk show in 1973: 
Now, when that came down to the White House, we took a look at it, and we 
also looked at the situation over there. I did personally. I had a hand in drafting 
the veto message. And if you look at the public television, you will find you've 
got Sander Vanocur and Robert MacNeil, the first of whom, Sander Vanocur, is 
a notorious Kennedy sycophant, in my judgment, and Robert MacNeil, who is 
anti-administration. You have the Elizabeth Drew show on, which is, she person-
ally, is definitely not pro-administration. I would say anti-administration. Wash-
ington Week in Review is unbalanced against us, you have Black Journal, which 
is unbalanced against us . . . you have Bill Moyers, which is unbalanced against 
the Administration. And then for a fig leaf they throw in William F. Buckley's 
program. 
CARNEGIE REPORT II, supra note 2, at 43. The Carnegie Commission criticizes the CPB 
during this crisis, suggesting that the Corporation board sacrificed public affairs pro-
gramming in an attempt to mollify the Nixon administration. See generally id. at 41-51. 
See also Chase, supra note 38, at 76-88. 
114 See note 100 supra. 
110 A statute is void if it "does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of 
[government) control, hut ... sweeps within its ambit other activities" protected by the 
first amendment. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (striking down state pro-
hibition on picketing because activity protected by the First Amendment was within its 
reach). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1967) (striking down stat-
ute which prohibited all members of Communist Party from working in any defense fa-
cility; "[the statute] casts its net across a broad range of associational activities, indis-
criminately trapping membership which can he constitutionally punished and 
membership which cannot."). 
A regulation may he invalidated for overhreadth for several possible reasons: because 
the government interest sought to he implemented is insufficient in relation to the inhib-
itory effect on First Amendment freedoms; because the means employed bears insuffi-
cient relation to the asserted governmental interest; or because the end could he 
achieved by a "less drastic means," less restrictive on First Amendment freedoms. See 
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to apply only to state licensees, the prohibition would remain 
objectionable. As with all broadcasters, the fairness doctrine and 
equal time provision should adequately protect the public from 
any editorial abuses by state licensees. This remedy cannot 
guarantee the total absenc_e of the government'~ point of view on 
a station; as long as the government does not monopolize the 
airwaves, however, there is no constitutional justification for 
prohibiting altogether the expression of the government position 
on a subject. "The ultimate danger is not that the government's 
point of view gets across, it is that the views of others do 
not. . . . "118 There is nothing in the First Amendment that pre-
vents the government from "affirmatively promoting" expres-
sion.117 One scholar of the First Amemdment believes the cur-
rent concentration of power over communications acquired by 
the mass media has so threatened the system of freedom of ex-
pression that government expression has now become "a neces-
sary and healthy part of the system. "118 
Editorials would not be effective vehicles for propagandizing. 
An editorial is the most visible expression of a station's position 
on an issue or a candidate. More serious abuses may occur in the 
note 106 supra; w. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 815-22, 
841-55 (1975). See also Israel, Elfrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath?, 1966 SUP. 
CT. REV. 193, 217-19; Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 844 (1970). 
11
• Canby, supra note 38, at 1127. 
117 [T]here is nothing in the negative force of the First Amendment, as a general 
matter, that would prevent the government from using public funds to support 
various features of the system of freedom of expreBBion. On the other hand, the 
negative features of the First Amendment do impose some restrictions upon the 
way government funds are expended. In general these limitations would be the 
same as in the case of the government furnishing physical facilities: there could 
be no discrimination between users and no regulation of content. 
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 651 (1970) (emphasis added). Con-
tra, Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 
CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1979) (advocating the recognition of an implied prohibition against 
government dissemination of political ideas in the First Amendment). 
118 T. EMERSON, supra note 117, at 698. Emerson finds the affirmative promotion of 
freedom of expression by the government "[t]he most challenging problem in First 
Amendment theory today." Id. at 627. The traditional system of freedom of expression 
was "essentially laissez-faire in character" with the First Amendment playing a negative 
role, protecting the system from government interference. Id. "At one time it may have 
't>een thought sufficient for the government to furnish an occasional public library and a 
one-room schoolhouse. But that degree of involvement is inadequate for a modem tech-
nological society." Id. at 672. 
Alexander Meiklejohn also supports the government taking affirmative steps to enrich 
public debate. Most important is a system of education able to "inform and cultivate the 
mind and will of the citizen," providing him with "the wisdom, the independence, and, 
therefore, the dignity of a governing citizen." Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An 
Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 257. See note 88 supra. 
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day-to-day programming decisions every station must make. 
The selection of programs, the times when they are broadcast, 
the choice of guests for panel discussions-all could be more eas-
ily abused to advocate subtly a particular position. This result 
cannot be so easily achieved by a clearly labelled editorial, which 
is obviously a purely partisan statement. 
Although it was not suggested by Congress when it enacted 
section 399(a), a possible rationale for section 399(a) is that in 
accepting the "privilege" of federal funds a station must also ac-
cept this restriction on the use of these funds. 119 The govern-
ment has no obligation to fund public broadcasting. The govern-
ment may of course impose reasonable conditions upon the use 
of federal funds. 120 If the government chooses to provide such 
funds, however, it cannot condition the acceptance of these 
funds on otherwise unconstitutional requirements. The "uncon-
stitutional condition" doctrine prevents the government from 
doing indirectly what an express constitutional provision forbids 
it to do directly.121 If the suppression of editorializing violates 
119 The overbreadth problem, see note 115 supra, is again present. Section 399(a) ap-
plies to some public licensees receiving no federal funds. See note 101 supra. Moreover,§ 
399(a) prohibits all editorializing by public licensees instead of that conducted only on 
programs specifically funded by CPB grants. 
11
• See, e.g., Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (uphold-
ing government contracts containing provisions regulating water usage; "beyond chal-
lenge is the power of the Federal Government to impose reasonable conditions on the use 
of federal funds, federal property, and federal privileges"); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 
333 n.34 (1968) (striking down Alabama regulation denying federal welfare aid to chil-
dren of a mother "cohabiting" with man to whom she is not married; "[t]here is of 
course no question that the Federal Government, unless barred by some controlling con-
stitutional prohibition, may impose the terms and conditions upon which its money al-
lotments to the States shall be disbursed. . ."). 
'"' Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional 
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-46 (1968). See also Bruff, Unconstitutional Conditions 
Upon Public Employment: New Departures in the Protection of First Amendment 
Rights, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 129 (1969); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1595 (1960). 
An early expression of the doctrine is found in Frost & Frost T,rucking Co. v. Railroad 
Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1924). Justice Sutherland stated: 
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation 
which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guar-
anteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same 
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a 
valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not nec-
essary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having 
power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees 
. fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one 
of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relin-
quishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one 
constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a 
surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitu-
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the First Amendment, Congress cannot achieve the same result 
by imposing unconstitutional conditions on its granting of funds 
to public broadcasting. 
Section 399(a) might also be viewed as a reasonable restriction 
on political expression by government employees which is analo-
gous to the Hatch Act122 and similar state provisions. The anal-
ogy, however, is inapposite. The Hatch Act forbids "federal em-
ployees" from taking "an active part in political management or 
political campaigns."123 Section 399(a), on the other hand, is not 
limited to government employees. The Hatch Act, moreover, is 
directed at political activity, not the political expression that 
section 399(a) prohibits.12• 
tion of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence. 
The famous dictum of Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 
216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892), that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right 
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman," has been repudi-
ated by the Court. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976) ("The denial of a 
public benefit may not be used by the government for the purpose of creating an incen-
tive enabling it to achieve what it may not command directly."); Perry v. Sindermann, 
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("[the government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a 
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interests in 
freedom of speech"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("[I]t is too late in the 
day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial 
of a placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege"). 
12
• 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1976). 
The Hatch Act is arguably inconsistent with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
See Van Alstyne, supra note 121, at 1447; Note, Patronage Dismissals: Constitutional 
Limits and Political Justifications, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 298-305 (1974). But the Su-
preme Court has consistently rejected this argument. See United States Civil Serv. 
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding Hatch Act 
limitations on political activities by federal employees); United Public Workers v. Mitch-
ell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946) (same); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (upholding an 
Oklahoma act regulating the political activities of state employees). 
"" 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1976). 
11
• "[P]lainly identifiable acts of political management and political campaigning may 
constitutionally be prohibited" on the part of federal employees. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. 
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973) (emphasis added). The Court 
found that the prohibition was compelled by the legislative judgment that "partisan po-
litical activities by federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate 
effectively and fairly, elections are to play their proper part in representative govern-
ment, and employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from improper influences." Id. 
at 564. 
However legitimate these concerns may be, they would not apply to public licensee 
editorializing. Unlike the role of most governmental employees, which is to impartially 
execute the laws, a public licensee's primary role is to provide informative programming 
to its viewers and listeners. Because the editorial power is not inconsistent with this 
informational role, the damage to responsible decision-making and the erosion of public 
confidence in government institutions that the Hatch Act seeks to prevent would not 
occur. 
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C. Section 399( a) and Equal Protection 
Section 399(a) prohibits editorializing by public broadcasters 
only, leaving commercial broadcasters free to editorialize. The 
critical question in all equal protection inquiries is "whether 
there is an appropriate governmental interest furthered by the 
differential treatment."1211 Where no fundamental rights are af-
fected by the classification, it is sufficient that there be a legiti-
mate governmental interest to which the classification reasona-
bly relates.128 When the equal protection claim is "intertwined 
with First Amendment interests"127 as here, however, strict scru-
tiny is required. These unequal burdens on First Amendment 
rights can be justified only by a compelling governmental inter-
est.128 Just as section 399(a) fails strict scrutiny under First 
Amendment analysis, 129 the statute also violates the equal pro-
tection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment due 
process clause. 180 
,.. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
11
• See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding statute 
prohibiting opticians from fitting eyeglasses without prescription from doctor). 
117 Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
It should be noted that the Court in Mosley employed an important but previ-
ously little-used doctrine. Ordinarily, in testing the constitutionality of content-
based restrictions, the Court focuses primarily on whether the restricted speech 
is sufficiently harmful to important state interests to warrant the restriction. In 
Mosley, however, the Court emphasized the difference in treatment between la-
bor and nonlabor speech and focused on whether the distinction itself was justi-
fied. The Court looked not to the harmfulness of the nonlabor speech as such, 
but to the relative harmfulness of labor and nonlabor speech. The issue, in.other 
words, was cast in equal protection as well as first amendment terms. 
Stone, supra note 94, at 87 n.27. Cf. A. MEIKLE.JOHN, supra note 88, at 27 ("[There is an] 
equality of status in the field of ideas."). 
11
• See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972) ("[T]he State must show a 
substantial and compelling reason for imposing durational residence requirements [on 
the right to vote]"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (invalidating one-
year waiting period for new residents seekiµg welfare; "since the classification here 
touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be 
judged by whether it promotes a compelling state interest"); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 
U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (restrictions on new political parties gaining a place on presidential 
election ballot in Ohio found violative of equal protection; "[t]he State has here failed to 
show any 'compelling interest' which justifies imposing such heavy burdens on the right 
to vote and to associate."). 
119 See notes 91-124 and accompanying text supra. 
180 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal Protection analysis in the 
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."). Accord, 
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636, 638 n.2 (1975). 
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D. Section 399(a) and Community-Service 
A case challenging the constitutionality of section 399(a) was 
recently dismissed on procedural grounds without reaching the 
merits of the First Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims.181 
Section 399(b), however, which .required public st~tions to keep 
audio recordings of all broadcasts of public importance, was 
found unconstitutional in 1978 by the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia ruling en bane in Community-Service 
Broadcasting of Mid-America v. FCC. 182 The court's analysis of 
the taping requirement supports striking down the editorializing 
ban as unconstitutional. · 
Judge Wright, speaking for five members of the court, invali-
dated section 399(b) as a violation of equal protection under the 
Fifth Amendment. The court held that since section 399(b) in-
volves a noncontent distinction affecting fundamental First 
Amendment rights, the distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial broadcasters must further a "substantial" gov-
ernmental interest that is "narrowly tailored" to serve that in-
terest. Judge Wright was unable to find a substantial interest 
justifying the recording requirement. 133 
Judge Wright also found section 399(b) in violation of the 
First Amendment under two levels of analysis.134 First, section 
399(b) was not "content neutral" because the recording require-
ment applied only if the subject matter of the programming in-
volved issues of public importance. Section 399(b) thus failed 
1
•
1 See note 85 supra. A Maine statute prohibiting public television stations which 
receive state funds from either supporting political candidates or "advocating or oppos-
ing any specific program ... of governmental action" was found unconstitutional by the 
Maine Supreme Court in 1970. State v. University of Maine, 266 A.2d 863 (Me. 1970). 
The Maine Supreme Court found the statute inconsistent with the fairness doctrine 
which required the discussion of conflicting views on controversial subjects. The court 
added: 
The designation of their licensed activities as "educational television broadcast-
ing" would indeed be a misnomer if state law could effectively preclude them 
from presenting programs which arelby their very nature essential to the educa-
tional process. [T]he State . . . has no . . . valid interest in protecting [its citi-
zens] from the dissemination of ideas as to which they may be called upon to 
make an informed choice. 
Id. at 868. See also Note, Maine's Educational Television Network: Legal Difficulties, 
22 MAINE L. REV. 239 (1970). 
10
• 593 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
, .. Id. at 1123. Judge Wright rejected the government's arguments that the recording 
requirement was necessary to preserve significant programming, to enforce the "objectiv-
ity and balance" requirements of 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(g)(l)(a), and to provide a means of 
federal oversight over federal funds. 
'"' This part of the court's opinion was joined only by one judge, Judge Wilkey. 
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· strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. m Second, even if 
the government interest in the recording requirement could be 
seen as unrelated to the suppression of free expression, Judge 
Wright would still find section 399(a) deficient under less strict 
First Amendment scrutiny. The government failed to show that 
the "incidental restrictions" on First Amendment freedoms were 
no greater than "essential" to further a "substantial government 
interest. 11186 
This analysis is fully applicable to section 399(a).137 The edito-
rializing ban regulates speech on the basis of its content,188 the 
speech is fully protected, 189 and there is no compelling interest 
in its suppression. uo 
· Judge Robinson's concurrence in Community-Service clarifies 
the question of the constitutionality of the editorializing ban. He 
declined to utilize First Amendment analysis because he did not 
agree that section 399(b) "facially" impinged on First Amend-
ment interests. 141 In examining possible justifications for the re-
cording requirement in his equal protection analysis, he noted 
that the FCC did not suggest that the recording requirement 
was designed to facilitate the section 399(a) editorializing ban of 
which it is structurally a part. Judge Robinson concluded that 
"[t]his reticence is due no doubt to uncertainty over whether 
section 399(a) could itself withstand constitutional scrutiny, for 
it is not a chill but a hard freeze and the legislative history is 
replete with troubling statements. "142 
The striking down of section 399(b) in Community-Service is 
thus a strong indication that the same fate awaits section 399(a). 
116 593 F.2d 1102, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
188 Id. at 1114-22. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (upholding 
conviction for burning draft card to protest the Vietnam War; "substantial" government 
interest in draft registration). 
117 The less strict "substantial government interest" test need not be applied to § 
399(a) because the editorializing ban prohibits speech on its face rather than by a mere 
incidental restraint. 
108 See note 94 and accompanying text supra. 
189 See notes 86-88 and accompanying text supra. 
140 See notes 91-124 and accompanying text supra. 
141 593 F.2d 1102, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Robinson, J., concurring in the result). 
141 Id. at 1128 n.25. 
Judge Robinson reviewed the legislative history of§ 399(b) and concluded that since 
the House version emerged from the joint conference, the House debate must be given 
"special significance . . . as an expression of the purpose the new statute was intended to 
serve." Id. (quoting United States v. Bartley, 581 F.2d 984, 988 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
Judge Robinson believed that the limitation that only editorials representing the man-
agement's opinion would be restricted, which emerged from the joint conference, "hardly 
served to dispel qualms ab~ut how the prescription on such editorializing might fare 
constitutionally." Id. See notes 54-63 and accompanying text supra. 
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If the 399(b) recording requirement had a chilling effect on pro-
tected speech, section 399(a) indeed constitutes an outright 
"freeze." 
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
A bill is currently pending before the House of Representa-
tives which would delete section 399(a). The proposed Commu-
nications Act of 1979,143 would drastically restructure current 
broadcasting regulation.14" This Act would remove section 399(a) 
"to permit public broadcasters to exercise the same journalistic 
freedom as is afforded to commercial broadcasters. No station of 
course would be required to editorialize."1411 Despite this propo-
sal, it is unlikely that Congress itself will delete section 399(a), 
either in this bill or in the future. 148 A House bill which after 
amendment became the Public Telecommunications Financing 
Act of 1978147 would have modified section 399(a) to allow edito-
rializing while retaining the prohibition against supporting polit-
ical candidates. 148 President Carter149 supported such a change. 
The Senate version did not,1110 however, and the modification 
"" H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
'" The new act would replace the FCC with a less powerful Communications Regula-
tory Commission. Id. § 211. The CPB would be replaced in 1983 by the Endowment for 
Program Development. Id. §§ 615, 621. 
,u STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN 
COMMERCE, 96TH CoNG., lsT SEss., H.R. 3333, "THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1979" SEC-
TION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 74 (Comm. Print 1979). 
"" Congressman Waxman, who was a plaintiff in the court challenge to§ 399(a), be-
lieves it is unlikely Congress will delete the prohibition in the future. Affidavit of Plain-
tiff Henry A. Waxman, League of Women Voters of Cal. v. FCC, No. CV 79-1562mml 
(PX) (C.D. Cal.). Congressman Waxman's assessment of the Congressional mood is rein-
forced by the recent vote of the Senate to defend the constitutionality of § 399(a) in the 
League of Women Voters litigation. See note 85 supra. 
"' Pub. L. No. 95-567, 92 Stat. 2405 (1978) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 390-398 (West 
Supp. 1979)). 
"
8 H.R. 12605, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 402 (1978). 
149 (1978) U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 5349, 5353. President Carter stated: 
Unlike commercial broadcasters, public broadcasters are forbidden by current 
law to editorialize on issues of public importance. The ban makes sense for sta-
tions licensed to a state or local government instrumentality. But Congress has 
recently amended the tax code to allow private non-profit organizations to advo-
cate positions on public issues. The Public Broadcasting Act should be similarly 
amended to allow non-governmental licensees to exercise their First Amendment 
rights. 
This change would not require editorials, but it would permit them. Public 
broadcasters should have an equal opportunity with commercial broadcasters to 
participate in the free marketplace of ideas. 
"'" S. 2883, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
Reaction in the Senate was almost unanimously negative to the proposal to delete § 
399(a). Senator McClure stated that editorializing would "allow noncommercial broad-
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was dropped in the joint conference. m 
CONCLUSION 
The section 399(a) editorializing ban should be declared un-
constitutional. Section 399(a) presently allows the government 
to prohibit an important area of expression in violation of the 
most important values 'of the First Amendment. As public 
broadcasting struggles to find a significant role in a commer-
cially dominated broadcasting system, it must be given the free-
dom to experiment and grow. The national publicity generated 
in 1979 by the release of the new Carnegie Report provides an 
ideal opportunity to focus attention on section 399(a) as an ob-
stacle to this growth. m 
The potential impact of section 399(a) goes beyond damage to 
the freedom of public licensees. What Judge Wright said of sec-
tion 399(b) in Community-Service is equally applicable to sec-
tion 399(a). "In this case the spectre of government censorship 
and control hovers, not only over public broadcasting, but over 
all broadcasting. For if this legislation is constitutional as to 
public broadcasting, similar legislation as to all broadcasting is 
standing in the wings. " 1118 The government will continue to have 
a role in the regulation of broadcasting, at least in the foresee-
able future. That role must be carefully scrutinized, however, 
and should never be allowed to interfere with free expression as 
it presently does with the section 399(a) prohibition of editorial-
casters to become embroiled in politics and political debate, [and] would, in my opinion, 
destroy the integrity and nonpartisan framework of the public service. . . . On several 
occasions PBS has offered programs which have seemed to many viewers to contain bla-
tantly partisan content or even left-wing propaganda." 1978 CONG. REC. 815452 (remarks 
of Sen. McClure). More damaging to the chances of deleting § 399(a) is the viewpoint 
held by Senator Hollings, Chairman of the Senate Communications Committee, that if 
public broadcasters were allowed to editorialize, it would be the "death knell of public 
broadcasting." Id. at 815453 (remarks of Sen. Hollings). 
1
•
1 H. CoNF. REP. No. 95-1774, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. 
CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 5389, 5402. 
... The Carnegie Commission declared: 
Public broadcast journalism must be carried on by professionals prepared to 
accept and live by the requirements of responsibility that go hand in hand with 
freedom. We believe, for example, that a mature journalistic role for public 
broadcasting will require that the institution speak out on matters of public pol-
icy, attempt to uncover wrongdoing, and occasionally criticize those in high 
places. Such criticism must be truthful and fair, but we believe that appropriate 
standards should be allowed to develop within the system, rather than by 
statute. 
CARNEGIE REPORT II, supra note 2, at 30 (latter emphasis added). 
'"" Community-Service Broadcasting of Mid-America v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1123 
(D.C. Cir. 1978). 
SPRING 1980] Editorializing Ban 
izing. It is appropriate to remember Justice Douglas' words: 
It is said, of course, that Government can control the 
broadcasters because their channels are in the public do-
main in the sense that they use the airspace that is the 
common heritage of all the people. But parks are also in 
the public domain. Yet people who speak there do not 
come under government censorship .... It is the tradi-
tion of Hyde Park, not the tradition of the censor, that is 
reflected in the First Amendment. m 
569 
-John C. Grabow 
, .. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 162 
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in the result). 

